by the Palmer dissent, be controversial enough. 12 Palmer's significance is magnified, however, because the opinion provides the theoretical basis for the total demise of constitutional rights of inmate privacy by implying that personal privacy, as well as privacy rights regarding one's papers and effects, also is unprotected. 13 This Article assesses the merits of the Palmer opinion and its implications for the continued vitality of constitutionally protected privacy in penal institutions. The critique reveals deficiencies in the Court's analysis of the scope of fourth amendment safeguards and argues (the Court's allusions to the contrary notwithstanding) that a doctrine of privacy protection is essential to safeguard inmates' basic human rights.
II. THE PALMER CASE
A.
THE FACTS
Palmer was an inmate at a Virginia Correctional Center 14 serving sentences for several theft offenses. Hudson, an officer at the Center, in an alleged effort to discover contraband, conducted a shakedown search of Palmer's cell and locker. The search uncovered a ripped pillowcase which was used to trigger a disciplinary action against Palmer for destroying state property. Pursuant to prison procedures, Palmer was found guilty and ordered to reimburse the state for the cost of the pillowcase; additionally, prison authorities entered a reprimand on Palmer's prison record.
Palmer subsequently brought a civil rights action in United States District Court contending, among other things, 15 that Hudson had violated his fourth amendment rights by conducting the shakedown solely for harassment purposes and by destroying certain of Palmer's noncontraband property, including legal materials and letters. 16 Hudson denied the allegations and received a sum- 12 See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text. 13 See infra notes 155-226 and accompanying text. 14 Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts discuss the degree of security manifested by the correctional center.
15 Palmer brought his action under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) . He raised a due process argument, not discussed in this Article, alleging that his property had been improperly taken and destroyed. Both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court rejected the due process claim on the theory that the state provided Palmer adequate postdeprivation remedies. See Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220 , 1222 -23 (4th Cir. 1983 ; Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. at 3203-05. Palmer also introduced additional due process claims and an eighth amendment argument, all of which were summarily dismissed by the district court and the Fourth Circuit, 697 F.2d at 1221 n.1, and not raised in the Supreme Court.
16 104 S. Ct. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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mary judgment. The district court accepted Palmer's allegations as true, but held that they were constitutionally insignificant.
17
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding the summary judgment premature because Hudson may have violated Palmer's "limited privacy right" against searches conducted solely for harassment. 18 The court of appeals found that unannounced shakedown searches of an inmate's property are necessary security protections, but determined that shakedowns of individual inmates are permissible only if "pursuant to an established program of conducting random searches of single cells or groups of cells reasonably designed to deter or discover the possession of contraband" 9 or upon proof "that some reasonable basis exist [s] for the belief that the prisoner possesse [s] contraband." 20 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 ' to consider, among other things, 22 "whether a prison inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell" entitling him to fourth amendment protection.
23

B. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION
The Supreme Court reversed the fourth circuit, holding that although inmates enjoy those constitutional rights "not fundamentally inconsistent with. . . the objectives of incarceration, " 24 fourth amendment protection of prison cells, even to the "limited" extent recognized by the court of appeals, was unavailable to Palmer.
5
The Court grounded its decision on Palmer's inability to establish a privacy interest sufficient to trigger the fourth amendment.
The Court determined the issue to be whether Palmer could satisfy the "justifiable expectation of privacy" test of Katz v. United States. 26 The applicability of the fourth amendment, according to the Palmer Court, turns on whether "the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy,' that has been invaded by government action." ' 
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More specifically, the Court invoked Justice Harlan's formulation in his concurring opinion in Katz: "We must decide, in Justice Harlan's words, whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy in his prison cell is the kind of expectation that 'society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable".' "28 The Court concluded that "society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell. .... "29 The Chief Justice found that protecting society's interest in maintaining the security of its penal institutions-volatile places where the threat of violence and the possession of contraband are ubiquitous 30 -is "impossible . . . if inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells." '31 The "limited" right articulated by the court of appeals would, in the opinion of the Palmer Court, enable inmates to anticipate the occurrence of shakedowns because they would eventually decipher the official scheme of "planned random searches." '3 2 Because their cells are " [v] irtually the only place inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband," 3 3 the Court found that "wholly random [cell] searches are essential to the effective security of penal institutions." 34 Only the "bright line" approach of denying fourth amendment protection altogether 3 5 protects against deterioration of prison security and order. "The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions. The Palmer Court also recognized the power of prison officials to seize from cells "any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institutional interests." 3 7 The redress of inmate losses caused by improper destruction of seized property rests under state rather than federal law. 3 8 The Court recognized the possibility of intrusions conducted solely to harass, and noted that "intentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized soci-28 Id. 29 Id. at 3200. 30 The Court referred to statistics reflecting the incidence of criminal activity within penal institutions. Id. Justice O'Connor joined the Court's opinion but concurred separately.
4 1 Justice O'Connor contended that Palmer's privacy claim was unfounded due to its failure to show "unreasonable" governmental action in light of the government's compelling interest in prison safety. 42 Citing United States v. Robinson, 43 she concluded that no case-by-case assessment of reasonableness in prison cases was necessary because the Court had held in other contexts that certain 39 Id. at 3201. The Court noted that "the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence of the essential character of that society." Id. at 3199.
40 The eighth amendment provides in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Palmer Court stated:
Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment does not mean that he is without a remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. Nor does it mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod over inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth Amendment always stands as a protection against 'cruel and unusual punishments.' By the same token, there are adequate state tort and common-law remedies available to respondent to redress the alleged destruction of his personal property. 104 S. Ct. at 3202. The Palmer Court did not recognize an alternative remedy for violation of privacy under a substantive due process theory. For a discussion of due process privacy, see infra notes 169-77 and accompanying text. Instead, the Court implied that a fourteenth amendment due process remedy was not available because it merged with the rejected fourth amendment privacy claim:
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals' decision rests at least in part upon a finding of an independent right of privacy for prisoners under the Fourteenth Amendment alone. Arguably, it is not entirely clear whether the Court of Appeals believed that the limited privacy right it recognized was guaranteed solely by the Fourth Amendment, and applicable to the States only through the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether the right emanated from the Fourteenth Amendment alone, or both. The court's opinion, however, explicitly speaks to the 'primary purpose of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,'. . . and nowhere does it suggest an intention to draw a distinction between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments right of privacy in prison cells. Under the circumstances, we assume, since there is no suggestion to the contrary, that the court did not mean to imply in this context that any right of privacy that might exist under the Fourteenth Amendment alone exceeds that that exists under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 3197 n.4. 41 104 S. Ct. at 3205 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
42 Id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring). S. 218 (1973) . Robinson holds that the fourth amendment permits warrantless searches of the person incident to lawful custodial arrests. The decision in Robinson is not concerned with defining "searches and seizures," but rather with when personal searches and seizures are "reasonable."
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contested practices are categorically permitted. 4 4 In light of the interests at stake, prison searches are the categorically reasonable products of necessarily ad hocjudgments of prison officials maintaining prison safety. 4 5 Moreover, according to Justice O'Connor, the "fact of arrest and incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy . . . interests in personal effects." '4 6 Consequently, "all searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate's cell are reasonable." 4 7
D.
THE PALMER DISSENT Justice Stevens,joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, dissented in Palmer, 48 contending that prisoners are entitled to fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches of their cells and seizures of their property. Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, 4 9 the dissenters found a clear fourth amendment violation in Hudson's malicious confiscation and destruction of Palmer's property-his possession of which was protected under state law and by several constitutional provisions. 50 Agreeing with the majority that the imperatives of prison administration require random searches of prison cells, 51 Justice Stevens rejected the view that the legitimacy of such searches negates the possibility of protecting inmate privacy in their cells and possessions. He granted that privacy rights will no doubt be "minimal" compared to conditions in the free world, but prisoners must be afforded a "slight residuum of privacy" in their cells lest they be totally stripped of their dignity. This case comes to us on the pleadings. We must take the allegations in Palmer's complaint as true. Liberally construing this pro se complaint as we must, it alleges that after examining it, . . . Hudson maliciously took and destroyed a quantity of Palmer's property, including legal materials and letters, for no reason other than harassment. Id. at 3207-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50 In addition to property rights under state law, the dissenters cited first amendment, eighth amendment, and due process theories as constitutional grounds protecting Palmer's interests in the confiscated materials. Id. at 3210-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 52 Id. at 3208, 3215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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slavery and humanity." 53 Moreover, the dissenters contested the empirical validity of the majority's conclusion that "society is [un] prepared to recognize [as reasonable] the possessory interests of prisoners" 5 4 and chided the majority for disregarding the significance of the fact that " [v] irtually every federal judge to address the question over the past decade has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does apply to a prison cell." 55 Apart from privacy considerations, Justice Stevens contended that Palmer's property rights themselves were sufficient to trigger fourth amendment protection. Hudson's actions clearly constituted a "seizure" depriving Palmer of his possessory interests in his property. 5 6 Having concluded that Palmer's complaint alleged a "search and seizure," the dissenters easily found fourth amendment "unreasonableness." The intrusion alleged by Palmer could not be penologically justified or excused, and therefore was necessarily unreasonable. 5 7 To the dissenters, protecting a residuum of inmate privacy and possessory rights to noncontraband property is essential to the government's goal of maintaining prison security. In the final analysis, however, any deference to institutional needs is totally undermined by the fact that Palmer's property was not contraband. If Palmer were allowed to possess the property, then there can be no contention that any institutional need or policyjustified the seizure and destruction of the property. Once it is agreed that random searches of a prisoner's cell are reasonable to ensure that the cell contains no contraband, there can be no need for seizure and destruction of noncontraband items found during such searches. Id. at 3215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 "[It appears to be the near-universal view of correctional officers that guards should neither seize nor destroy noncontraband property." Id. at 3213 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing Schwartz, supra note 2. 60 104 S. Ct. at 3214 (Stevens,J., disssenting). 'It is anomalous to provide a prisoner Justice Stevens also disputed the Chief Justice's assessment of the dangerousness of prisons, pointing out that the homicide rate in prisons is "significantly lower than. . . in many. . . major cities." 6 1 Moreover, many inmates, even in maximum security institutions, are not violent people 62 and most minimum security facilities are populated by inmates who pose no realistic threat to security ... . These considerations led the dissenters to suspect that the interest in institutional security may be something of a red herring in the majority opinion. To Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice's position might best be explained as an unstated willingness to sacrifice constitutional principle on the altar of expediency. In addition to promoting its view of wise penal administration, 64 the Palmer Court's adoption of a "bright line" rule avoided the possibility of flooding the courts with frivolous lawsuits 6 5 -a fear, the dissenters pointed out, which posed insufficient justification for modifying pre-Palmer case law permitting inmates fourth amendment protection. In fact the "flood" had never materialized under such case law, and the dissenters believed that it could easily be handled if it ever occurred. The Court's portrayal of the stereotypical prison inmate entirely overlooks the wide range of individuals who actually have served and do serve time in the prison system. It ignores, for example, the conscientious objectors who refuse to register for the draft, and the corporate executives who have been convicted of violating securities, antitrust or tax laws, union leaders, former White House aides, former governors, judges, and legislators, famous writers and sports heroes, and many thousands who have committed serious offenses but for whom crime is by no means a way of life.
Id. at 3215 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 3209 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority did not address the security level of the penal institution involved in the case; thus Palmer cannot be read as automatically limiting the fourth amendment rights of only those inmates confined in maximum security institutions.
64 Id. at 3216 (Stevens, J., dissenting While the Palmer dissent points out these deficiencies, it fails to explore other fundamental problems with the Chief Justice's opinion. The remainder of this Article will address two such problemsthe Court's general analytical approach to defining the scope of the fourth amendment, and the effect of Palmer on issues of prisoners' rights to personal privacy.
III. DEFINING FOURTH AMENDMENT SCOPE
The Palmer Court continues an analytic tradition begun by Katz v. United States. 7 1 In Katz, the Court rejected earlier judicial attempts to define "searches and seizures" in terms of physical intrusions into certain protected areas and adopted an approach extending the fourth amendment to situations where the government invades recognizable privacy. 7 2 While the emergence of a privacy oriented test is laudable in principle, 7 3 sound doctrinal advancement has been 68 With no disrespect intended toward the ChiefJustice, the following observation of Hugo Bedau might be noted: "Along with patriotism, security-national security and prison security-is the last refuge of scoundrels." Bedau, How to Argue About Prisoners' Rights: Some Simple Ways, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 687, 702 (1981 frustrated by judicial interpretations of Katz which have resulted in an unfortunate restriction of the scope of the fourth amendment. Palmer perpetuates this misguided trend.
A.
THE KATZ STANDARD
In Katz, the Court laid the foundation for defining the scope of the fourth amendment's protection of privacy, 74 the central value underlying the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 7 5 The Katz Court held that governmental use of an electronic monitoring device placed on the outside of a public telephone to intercept Katz's phone conversations involving illegal gambling activities constituted an illegal search and seizure. The government had invaded Katz's "justifiable reliance on privacy," therefore a fourth amendment "search and seizure" had occurred that was "unreasonable" for want of a supporting warrant.
76
The Court in Katz perceived the issue of defining fourth amendment "reasonableness" as distinct from the analytically prior issue of determining whether or not a "search or seizure" has occurred.
77
Moreover, searches and seizures are not limited to specific constitutionally protected areas like the home, but occur whenever the government intrudes on one's legally recognizable privacy. 7 8 Katz is 220-40 (1978) ; C. WHrrEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTrrUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 91-94 (1980) . 75 "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949 803 (1980) . The Supreme Court recently addressed the school search issue, holding that the fourth amendment protects students from searches and seizures by school authorities unless supported by "reasonable suspicion" that the student was violating either the law or a school rule. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) .
Equally problematic are the "toilet spy" cases where police conduct clandestine surveillance of public restrooms. Some courts find such intrusions to be within the scope of the fourth amendment, especially if the restroom stalls have doors. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 (1968); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970 ment by defeating claims of subjective privacy by simply notifying the public that a given area previously thought to be private would henceforth be systematically invaded. 83 On the other hand, the subjective test would trigger fourth amendment protections where claimants assert actual privacy reliances in situations where such claims appear ridiculous.
84
In an attempt to clarify the scope of the privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment, Justice Harlan articulated his "reasonable expectation of privacy" test embraced in Palmer 85 and previously accepted by the Court. 86 Justice Harlan added an "objective" prong: "there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "87
B. JUSTICE HARLAN'S TEST: AMBIGUITIES AND INADEQUACIES
WhileJustice Harlan's test avoids the evils of a totally subjective test, it has substantial flaws. 8 8 The requirement that "society... The Harlan test may be interpreted two different ways: one with an 83 Professor Amsterdam summarizes the problems inherent in a subjective test:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance. Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 384.
84 For example, imagine that a police officer walking his beat at high noon in a public park observes a defendant commit a crime. The defendant argues that the observation constitutes a warrantless search because the defendant actually believed his conduct took place in "private" because he took the precaution of checking for police prior to committing the offense.
85 See supra text accompanying note 28. 86 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) . 87 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 88 Some courts have used the subjective prong ofJustice Harlan's test to deny fourth amendment protection in cases where the reasonableness of the intrusion arguably might demand attention. See, e.g., People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App. 3d 476, 482, 85 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296 (1970) . In Califano, the defendant was placed in a police interview room with an accomplice. A hidden microphone recorded incriminating remarks. The defendant's fourth amendment challenge was rejected because, among other things, the court concluded that he entertained no subjective expectations of privacy based upon his remark: "They ... are probably listening right now [laughter] ."
89 One commentator has suggested that Katz destroyed "whatever clarity" had existed in the law defining fourth amendment scope. White, The Fourth Amendment as a 1Vav, of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 174. [Vol. 76
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empirical emphasis aimed at discovering and describing normal privacy expectations-those which people "reasonably" possess in fact-the other directed towards the normative problem of determining rights to possess privacy expectations -those which people "reasonably" deserve to possess.
The "empirical" interpretation assumes an objective ability to determine whether a legally recognizable privacy intrusion has occurred in a given case. 90 Inferences from established social practices may provide guidance in some cases, but often no objective referent will exist to measure whether society recognizes a given privacy expectation as reasonable. 9 ' In such cases, courts applying the "empirical" interpretation will likely resort to either of two approaches, both of which have a tendency to constrict the scope of the fourth amendment.
The first approach appeals to assumption of risk analysis in defining "reasonable expectations of privacy." If a reasonable person would have taken precautions to protect privacy, no fourth amendment intrusion occurs when such precautions are not taken and the government intrudes. 9 2 Individuals assume the risk of government intrusion when they fail to take sufficient precautions against intrusion. Thus, the failure to pull the curtains precludes "a reasonable expectation of privacy" in a room whose interior could not be observed from ground level but into which FBI agents peered with binoculars while atop a ladder on railroad tracks thirty-five feet away.
93
The second judicial approach in applying the "empirical" inter9o Professor Yackle describes the "empirical interpretation" of the Harlan test as follows:
In recent cases, the Court has looked not for the individual's 'justifiable' but for his or her 'reasonable' or 'legitimate' expectation of privacy. The difference is more than semantical. The latter phrases invite reference not to the Constitution itself, to 'what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect,' but rather to what expectations contemporary Americans in fact have. It is as though the fourth amendment only mirrors existing understandings, protecting privacy more or less as expectations that privacy be protected rise and fall. Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REV. 335, 361 (1978) . 
1985]
pretation ofJustice Harlan's test is to balance interests in discerning "reasonable expectations of privacy." Given the absence of external standards, courts sometimes weigh alleged privacy interests against other values-most often the need for effective law enforcement-in deciding whether a search or seizure has occurred. 9 4 Thus, if an intrusion reflects "normal" police behavior generally conducive to the realization of law enforcement interests, the conduct may be judged "reasonable." 9 5 If so, the courts may find claimed privacy expectations to be "unreasonable" or non-existent. 96 471, 475 (1971) (police acted "reasonably" in using fire escape to observe suspect in his apartment to determine whether he would offer armed resistance to police entry).
96 In both Cooper and Solis, the courts weighed the reasonableness of the police action against the privacy claims of defendants and held that no search had occurred. In Cooper, the court stated: "It follows that the officer's utilization of the fire escape was . . . reasonable. That is to say, in the circumstances. . . the procedure followed by the officers constituted no unreasonable invasion of appellant's right to privacy." Cooper, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 475. Likewise, in Solis, the court stated:
The dogs' intrusion such as it was into the air space open to the public in the vicinity of the trailer appears to us reasonably tolerable in our society. . . . We hold that the use of the dogs was not unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore not a prohibited search under the fourth amendment. 536 F.2d at 882-83. See also Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1021-22, where the court reasoned that because the use of dogs to sniff students for drugs constituted an acceptable "aid" to school administrators in the reasonable exercise of their educational duties, the sniffs of students by the dogs infringed no justifiable expectations of privacy.
The judiciary has used similar reasoning in assessing the fourth amendment interests of parolees while on parole. Courts have often concluded that parolees enjoy diminished expectations of privacy solely because law enforcement interests in supervising parole through periodic privacy invasions appear especially strong. See, e.g Finally, the Supreme Court engaged in the balancing approach in holding that bank depositors possess no legitimate expectation of privacy in their bank records because the government has a strong interest in obtaining access to such information:
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records to be maintained because they 'have Both varieties of the empirical interpretation of the expectation of privacy test are misguided. The assumption of risk analysis places virtually no a priori limits on governmental surveillance. As Professor Amsterdam noted:
[U]nless the fourth amendment controls tom-peeping and subjects it to a requirement of antecedent cause to believe that what is inside any particular window is indeed criminal, police may look through windows and observe a thousand innocent acts for every guilty act they spy out. Should we say that prospect is not alarming because the innocent homeowner need not fear that he will get caught doing anything wrong? The fourth amendment protects not against incrimination, but against invasions of privacy. . . . The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.
98
The balancing approach also is defective. By weighing the reasonableness of the law enforcement action against the privacy claim, 9 9 the balancing approach rejects the teaching of Katz that searches and seizures occur when privacy is invaded whether or not the government's conduct is "reasonable" 10 0 and tends to constrict the effectuation of constitutional values. 10 ' To determine the reasonableness of governmental conduct, courts applying the balancing approach often employ non-technical, common-sense concepts of rationality and weigh them against privacy claims.' 0 2 While a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings. ' United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976 1968) , provides a vivid example of the Court's attempts to distinguish the "search" and "reasonableness" issues. The Teny Court painstakingly found "stops" and "frisks" to be privacy violations and thus searches and seizures before holding them to be reasonable under certain circumstances. Id. at 16-17, 19-31. An advocate of assumption of risk analysis offers this condemnation of the balancing approach: "The 'reasonableness' of privacy expectations must be measured by how the 'average person' shields his private activities from public exposure, not by the 'reasonableness' of restricting a given police stratagem." Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. REv. 831, 838 (1972) . 101 See Gianelli & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1064-66. 102 The concept of rationality expressed in the text is really more of a description of normal and supposedly necessary police practices rather than a rigorous fourth amendment evaluation of such. Therefore, the analysis tends to be empirical rather than normative. The analysis is "non-technical" in the sense that it avoids assessing the police
1985]
MARTIN R. GARDNER common sense notions of normal or generally acceptable police conduct might appear relevant in assessing whether or not "society is prepared to recognize a privacy claim as reasonable,"°1 0 3 a court utilizing this form of "rationality" often disposes of the case on the theory that no "search" occurred without ever considering the issue of the fourth amendment reasonableness or justification of the intrusion. 10 4 Police conduct, reasonably acceptable in general terms, effectively balances away the claim that a "search" occurred. Consequently, the balancing approach risks denying fourth amendment consideration entirely in situations where privacy has clearly been invaded but where ad hoc judicial comparisons determine that law enforcement concerns outweigh the privacy interest.
10 5
Such deficiencies in the "empirical interpretation" of the Harlan test have led many commentators to reject that approach in favor of a "normative interpretation" of the test, 10 6 directing the inquiry away from discovering empirically reasonable expectations towards explicating morally justifiable ones. The normative theorists characteristically scrutinize the type of governmental intrusion at issue and determine whether its systematic use would be intolerable in light of underlying constitutional values. Professor LaFave states:
It must be asked whether permitting the police regularly to engage in that type of practice, limited by nothing 'more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials,' requires the 'people' to which the Fourth Amendment refers to give 'up too much freedom as the cost of privacy.' That is, the fundamental inquiry is whether that practice, if not subjected to Fourth Amendment restraints, would be intolerable beconduct in terms of such traditional fourth amendment considerations as the need for particularized suspicion prior to intrusions or of the desirability of appeal to the warrant process. See Note, supra note 91, at 1474 n.71.
103 Justice Harlan's test requires assessing the situation from society's point of view, a point of view which may or may not embrace the Constitution's protection of individual rights.
104 Intrusions may be upheld due to an absence of privacy expectations as balanced against law enforcement interests without addressing such fourth amendment issues as the requirement of particularized suspicion prior to the intrusion or of the need for a search or arrest warrant. See supra notes 95, 96, 102 & 103.
105 See Note, supra note 91, at 1474. The Supreme Court warned against a similar approach in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969) :
It is argued in the present case that it is 'reasonable' to search a man's house when he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection . .. would approach the evaporation point.
Id.
106 See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text; see also Gianelli & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1067-68; Yackle, supra note 90, at 358-63. [Vol. 76
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cause it would either encroach too much upon the 'sense of security' or impose unreasonable burdens upon those who wished to maintain that security.
7
Professor Amsterdam invokes a similar conception:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a valuejudgment. It is whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment lurking underneath the Supreme Court's decision in Katz, and it seems to me the judgment that the fourth amendment inexorably requires the Court to make.1 0 8
Perhaps the most significant articulation of the normative approach is offered by Justice Harlan himself, who ultimately disavowed the emerging empirical focus on privacy expectations spawned by his Katz concurrence.
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present. Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as to mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.' 0 9
Courts making a Katz inquiry, therefore, should not decide matters of fact about privacy, either in the sense of how "society" views the matter or whether the claimant actually entertains an expectation. Rather, they should determine the issue in light of underlying constitutional values addressing whether given expectations of privacy ought to be recognized.
While the normative approach may be somewhat circular -"the fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim fourth amendment protection" 
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area, but conduct themselves forthrightly in gathering evidence.112 On the other hand, the normative approach has the distinct advantage over its empirical counterparts of forcing judicial attention to underlying constitutional values in deciding questions of fourth amendment coverage.
C. THE EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATION: THE EMERGING APPROACH
The Supreme Court has embraced the empirical interpretation of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, despite the normative theorists' admonitions to the contrary. The Court has found the assumption of risk approach particularly attractive. 1 1 3
The Court explicitly employed assumption of risk analysis in Smith v. Maryland ' 14 to support the conclusion that a police instigated installation of a "pen register" 1 5 to record numbers dialed from a suspect's phone did not constitute a fourth amendment "search." The Court applied Justice Harlan's Katz standard,' 16 doubting that the suspect entertained subjective expectations of privacy regarding the phone numbers he dialed.1 7 Even if the subjective expectation of privacy prong of the Katz test had been satisfied, however, the Court concluded that the suspect's expectation was not "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' "under the objective prong. 118 Because the suspect voluntarily conveyed information about the dialed numbers to the phone company,1 9 he "assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed."' A governmental informer, carrying a concealed radio transmitter, engaged defendant in incriminating conversations in his home which were overheard by the use of the radio equipment. The defendant clearly assumed the risk that any confidant might simply go to the police with the incriminating information, thus the Court held that the defendant assumed the risk that his confidant was wired. Id. at 751-53.
Several Justices dissented in White including justice Harlan, the author of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" formula in Katz. See 
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The Court employed similar reasoning in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 12 1 holding that the petitioner's failure to take "normal precautions to maintain . . . privacy"' 12 2 when entrusting possession of illegal drugs to an acquaintance who put them in her purse led to a denial of his "standing" to raise fourth amendment objection to a subsequent police search of the purse.1 23 The Rawlings Court found that because petitioner had no right to exclude other persons from access to the purse, he had no claim against the government.' 24 Presumably, the petitioner assumed the same risk of intrusion from the government as was posed by the owner of the purse.' 25 Thus, the absence of privacy expectations against a private third party led the Court to the conclusion that no such expectations existed against the government.'
26
The recent "beeper" cases also reflect the assumption of risk approach. In United States v. Knotls, 12 7 the Court applied the Smith risk analysis, 128 holding that no search occurred when the government monitored the whereabouts of a suspicious chemical 12 9 by hiding a beeper device in the chemical's container prior to the time a suspect possessed it. The beeper permitted surveillance of the chemical as it traveled in the suspect's car. Because the suspect would have no expectation of privacy had his car been visually followed by the police, the Court found that no increased privacy expectation was created by means of the hidden beeper. 13 0 The suspect assumed the risk of surveillance either way.
Once inside a private dwelling, however, the risks of surveilsuspect "should be entitled to assume that the numbers he dials in the privacy of his home will be recorded, if at all, solely for the phone company's business purposes." Id. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting "Determining whether an expectation of privacy is. .. 'reasonable,'" according to the Palmer Court, "necessarily entails a balancing of interests," specifically the "interest of society in the security of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in the privacy within his cell. '' 136 The Court strikes the balance in favor of the government based upon the perceived weight of empirical data establishing security risks within penal institutions. Simply because the government's interest is judged substantial, the Court concludes that Palmer has no reasonable expectation of privacy, thus negating his claim without ever assessing it in terms of the underlying constitutional values. The Court concludes that prisoners have no legiti-131 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) . 132 Id. at 3303-04. 133 Id. 134 The Court could have concluded that Palmer assumed the risk of privacy intrusions by committing crimes sufficient to send him to prison where such violations are known to be the "order of the day." Something approaching this reasoning is found in J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975) , where the court found no "search" where a foster parent eavesdropped upon telephone conversations of the juvenile in her charge.
The court based its reasoning partly on the view that the juvenile had been placed in the foster home as an alternative to placement in a correctional institution where "official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day." Id. at 175 (footnote omitted). Apparently, to the court inJ.M.A., risks of such intrusions are assumed by those committing offenses. See also van den Haag, supra note 1, at 159: "[T]he criminal foregoes privacy by voluntarily acting against the public interest, of which, therefore he becomes an object. Justice O'Connor reaches the same result by blurring the "search" and "reasonableness" issues and finding prison searches and seizures categorically "reasonable" because governmental interests outweigh prisoners' privacy claims.
1 3 8 Like the ChiefJustice, Justice O'Connor generates her conclusion in light of empirical considerations establishing prison security needs, paying little attention to fourth amendment values.
Even the Palmer dissenters seem somewhat beguiled by this empirical approach. While more sensitive to normative considerations than their colleagues in the majority, 3 9 the dissenters nevertheless note the absence of empirical data-as if it were crucial-as a flaw in the conclusion that society is not prepared to recognize the reasonableness of Palmer's claim.
140
The Palmer Court's reliance on the balancing approach is significant because it signals an increased level of commitment by the Court to empirical assessments of the issue of fourth amendment scope. Although the assumption of risk approach is also essentially empirical,' 4 ' it differs from the balancing approach by isolating the privacy claim and analyzing it apart from law enforcement issues. Risk analysis, while controversial, 4 2 at least possesses the analytic virtue of assessing the privacy issue in the abstract without injecting law enforcement interests into the inquiry. 143 The fourth amendment supposedly protects personal privacy and not governmental For authority for her "categorical" approach to prison searches (see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text),Justice O'Connor relied on United States v. Robinson, but the value of Robinson is questionable in the context of Palmer because the issue in Robinson was whether intrusions, admittedly "searches and seizures," were "reasonable" in the absence of warrants. See supra note 43. Robinson may thus support a "balancing" approach on the "reasonableness" issue, but is tenuous authority for a similar approach on the "search and seizure" issue. 139 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 140 See supra text accompanying note 54. 141 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. 142 See supra text accompanying notes 98 & 109. 143 Assumption of risk theory is thus more consistent with the analytic tradition of separating the "search" and "reasonableness" issues. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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interests in law enforcement.
14 4 The balancing approach poses substantial risk of "balancing away" privacy in favor of accommodations to law enforcement1 45 in a variety of contexts, 1 46 without ever addressing the fourth amendment reasonableness of the particular intrusion. 147 The Palmer decision vividly illustrates the need for a normative approach to fourth amendment issues of scope. The Court never explains why -even granting the full thrust of the government's claims -Palmer must be denied that tiny residuum of privacy which would permit him to litigate his claims of guard harassment, 4 8 a blatant form of unreasonable governmental conduct. When the issue is normatively couched in terms of whether Palmer's privacy claims should be recognized in light of fourth amendment values, the Palmer result appears incorrect.' 4 9 The systematic employment of harassment searches, limited only by the self-restraint of prison functionaries, certainly results in an "amount of privacy remaining to citizens . . diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free. . . society."15 0 If the Palmer Court is serious in claiming 144 See supra note 75. 145 Apart from the questionable wisdom of negating inmate rights by appeals to security needs (see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text), some commentators argue that the balancing approach is logically incoherent in cases such as Palmer. Assuming a "right" in the prison administration to maintain prison security, it hardly follows that Palmer has no right to privacy:
If a prisoner's right conflicts with somebody else's right, it does not necessarily follow that it is the prisoner who must tolerate without protest the subordination or repudiation of his right; it may well be the other party whose right should give way. All that follows from a situation in which two rights conflict is that the proper course of conduct cannot be settled without appealing to something apart from the conflicting rights themselves. Bedau, supra note 68, at 698 (footnote omitted). 146 The Palmer analysis may extend beyond the prison context to privacy issues arising in jails. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. Moreover, the balancing approach may well result in a denial of fourth amendment coverage in contexts not explored in this Article, such as juvenile detention centers (see supra note 134), and mental hospitals (see, e.g., State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1979) ), where security demands are said to be especially high. 147 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 148 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 149 The language of the Palmer Court's test can be read as embracing a normative assessment of the scope issue. In addition to deciding whether privacy expectations are "reasonable," the Court indicates that the inquiry should be directed towards "justifiable" expectations as well. See supra text accompanying note 27. The distinction is not merely semantic, given the fact that the latter term invites attention to constitutional values while the former may be simply a matter of discovering factual or "normal" expectations. See Yackle, supra note 90, at 361. [Vol. 76
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that "intentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society," ' 1 51 it must recognize the fourth amendment validity of Palmer's claim. Regardless of countervailing interests, Palmer ought to have a sufficient privacy interest to enable him to litigate the merits of his case. 152 Such a conclusion does not deny prison authorities the power to conduct random shakedowns. It simply denies them the power to conduct malicious ones. 1 53 The Court should remember the admonition of Professor Amsterdam:
The question of what constitutes a covered 'search' or 'seizure' should be viewed with an appreciation that to exclude any particular police activity from coverage is essentially to exclude it from judicial control and from the command of reasonableness, whereas to include it is to do no more than say that it must be conducted in a reasonable manner. With the question put in this fashion, the answer should seldom be delivered against coverage.
154
By excluding harassment searches from fourth amendment scrutiny, the Court ignores privacy claims regarding prison cells. But, as discussed immediately below, Palmer may be the harbinger of even more substantial denials of inmate privacy, resulting in a constitutional void that jeopardizes the protection of basic human rights of the incarcerated. 151 See supra note 39. 152 Successful harassment suits would no doubt be very rare due to difficulties for inmates to effectively prove their claims. The infrequency of success should be no reason, however, to deny all inmates the opportunity to prove their cases. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. On the other hand, permitting such suits may be vitally significant from the inmate's point of view. See supra text accompanying note 53.
For a discussion of theoretical problems in bringing harassment actions once the fourth amendment remedy is removed, see infra text and notes 169-77, 182-86, 215-26. 153 The doctrine advocated in the text would find "searches and seizures" whenever inmates allege privacy intrusions motivated solely for the purpose of harassment. This Article also suggests that certain other alleged privacy intrusions should fall within the scope of the fourth amendment. See infra notes 193-214 and accompanying text.
The proposed approach breaks with traditional scope analysis in its attention to the intent of the searcher as a crucial factor in defining protected privacy. For the view that the privacy issue should be determined without taking the conduct of the governmental intruder into account, see supra text accompanying note 77. Thus the proposed approach, like most normative varieties, tends to blur "search" and "reasonableness" issues. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. The proposed approach does not, however, beg the "reasonableness" issue by its finding that malicious, harassing intrusions constitute searches and seizures. The approach simply takes the alleged bad faith of the searcher into account by giving the inmate "standing" to litigate the issue of the reasonableness of the intrusion. See supra note 123. "Harassment searches" generate standing because they violate the residuum of privacy to which inmates are entitled. See supra notes 58, 59 & 149-52 and accompanying text. 154 Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 393.
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MARTIN R. GARDNER
IV. PALMER AND THE PROTECTION OF PRISONERS' DIGNITY
Despite the dissenters' hopes that an enclave of protected personal privacy will remain intact after Palmer, 15 5 the logic of the majority opinion seriously undercuts all privacy claims by prisoners. If so, the total loss of privacy protection precludes adequate judicial oversight of fundamental rights of human dignity.
A. PALMER AND PERSONAL PRIVACY
While Palmer dealt with searches of cells, its rationale equally extends to personal searches of inmates. The threat of secreting contraband or weapons on the person is no less substantial than the risk of such items being kept in prison cells. 156 If interests of prison security outweigh claims of privacy in cells, the same interests negate assertions of rights to privacy of the person, unless of course personal privacy is perceived as constitutionally more substantial than the privacy interest raised in Palmer. Although some lower courts have held that intrusions into personal security are "searches" where the same means of intrusion directed to personal property is not within the scope of the fourth amendment, REv. 1033 REv. , 1050 REv. -51 (1982 (questioning legitimacy of routine body cavity intrusions due to "anatomical considerations" which limit the kinds and amounts of contraband that can be secreted on the body).
157 See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477-78, reh'g denied, 693 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1982 ) (dog sniffs of school students are "searches," but dog sniffs of their lockers and automobiles are not "searches").
158 See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text. Outside the prison context, the Court has cautioned that intrusions into the body will be scrutinized more strictly than less intrusive searches of the person. [Vol. 76
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contact visits with persons from outside the institution. The Court admitted that the issue of body-cavity searches "instinctively gives us the most pause"' 61 and that "abusive" searches of the person "cannot be condoned," 162 but applied exactly the same reasoning process in upholding both the shakedown and body inspection intrusions. Assuming arguendo that inmates retain some fourth amendment rights, the Court weighed the privacy interest against the state interest in maintaining institutional security.
16 3 The Court held that both the cell shakedowns and the body-cavity intrusions were reasonable as necessary security measures. 16 4 Moreover, the Wolfish Court intimated that its analysis would apply in both prison and jail contexts.
5
Palmer rejects the Wofish view that prisoners might retain privacy in their cells. Rather than assess the reasonableness of shakedowns on a case-by-case basis, the Palmer Court opts for a bright line rule denying privacy protection altogether. The virtues of a similar bright line rule for personal searches are equally persuasive. Assuming that balancing is now the order of the day, the government's interest in routinely searching the persons of inmates may be more "reasonable," in general, than their claims that such action constitutes invasions of privacy. If so, the same logic which led to rejecting Wofish's position regarding the nature of privacy in cells may also lead to rejecting its notion that personal privacy might be protected.
The Wofish Court was concerned that personal searches not be "abusive."' 166 This concern is no guarantee, however, that the fourth amendment is available to remedy abuses when they occur. The Palmer Court also warned against the evils of harassment searches, 167 yet it denied privacy protection to prisoners' papers and effects. The Supreme Court thus may view abusive searches of the person as it does non-personal harassment searches: not as violations of protected privacy, but rather as matters governed by the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. 164 Id. at 557-60. 165 Id. at 558. For the sake of argument, the Court assumed that "both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections facility."
166 See supra text accompanying note 162. 
1985] B. PRIVACY AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Although Palmer seems to undercut the fourth amendment basis for rights to privacy in either the shakedown or personal search contexts, inmates arguably might retain privacy protection under substantive due process doctrine. 1 6 9 Palmer does not specifically address the issue,°7 0 but the Court would probably reject due process privacy claims for the same reasons it dismissed the fourth amendment privacy argument.
If society is unwilling to recognize the reasonableness of inmate claims to protected privacy as a fourth amendment matter, these claims would not suddenly become tenable under a due process doctrine that requires that a personal right be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" before qualifying as protected privacy. 17 1 In light of Palmer, inmates appear to lack such "fundamental" interests. Moreover, they may be unable to show a sufficient "liberty" interest as the necessary due process predicate for the right to privacy. 17 2 The Court has held in procedural due process contexts that prisoners possess no constitutionally based liberty interest once convicted and sentenced to prison. 173 Therefore, prisoners' claims of a substantive right to however, is not a prison case-it dealt with the taking of a blood sample from a suspect while in a hospital. This citation in Wofish is made in the context of a discussion which merely assumes for the sake of argument that the fourth amendment applies to personal searches, the same tenuous ground granted cell searches by Woylish. As Palmer rejects the arguendo premise for cell searches, it seemingly entails a rejection of Wofih 's similar premise that personal searches are arguendo within fourth amendment purview.
169 "The doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed has come to be known as substantive due process." Developments: The Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 REV. , 1166 REV. (1980 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (abortion as right to privacy under due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ; id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 503 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (right to marital privacy under fourteenth amendment due process clause). See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) ("[G] iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.") The Meachum Court used this reasoning to reject a prisoner's claim that transfer from one prison to another constituted a denial of liberty triggering procedural due process requirements. The Court found that "[tihe conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons." Id. (emphasis in original). See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 462 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" [T] he Court seems to assume that after his conviction a prisoner has, in essence, no [Vol. 76 PRISONER PRIVACY RIGHTS privacy grounded in due process likely would be rejected by the Court. 174 Palmer itself implicitly denies the viability of due process privacy. The Court intimated that any such claim merged with the fourth amendment issue. 175 Moreover, in arguing against fourth amendment applicability, Hudson maintained that either the due process clause or the eighth amendment was the appropriate constitutional doctrine to attack harassment searches. 7 6 The Palmer Court does not mention due process as a possible remedy for such searches, but does explicitly note the eighth amendment alternative.' 7 7 Thus, the Court appears to disfavor the due process privacy theory and view the cruel and unusual punishments clause as the sole constitutional remedy for abusive searches of either persons or effects.
C. PRIVACY PROTECTION IN JAILS
Thus far this Article's discussion of Palmer and Wolfish has centered on the Court's abandonment of privacy protection for convicts sentenced to prison. The same result would seem to obtain, however, in assessing the rights of pretrial detainees held in jail.
The Wofish opinion suggests that privacy issues in jails and prisons are analytically identical. Although many jail inmates are not yet liberty save that created, in writing, by the State which imprisons him."); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (state statutes may create prisoner liberty interests under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
174 Various commentators apparently agree that a prisoner privacy right is tenuous under the Griswold line, perhaps favoring such a right under the fourth amendment. See supra note 169. Fourth amendment privacy is understood as the right to withhold information or experience of oneself from others. See D. RICHARDS, MORAL CRmICIsM OF LAW 93 (1977). In contrast, the sexual privacy aspects of cases like Griswold and Roe v. Wade turn on the quite different interest in "actfing] in certain ways without threat of governmental sanction or interference or penalty." Id. Thus, substantive due process privacy creates a "zone of autonomy," a "right to freedom from official regulation" rather than the traditional fourth amendment "freedom from official intrusion." Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 REV. , 1424 REV. -25 (1974 . See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977) (fourth amendment violations are by nature "intrusions into individual privacy").
For prisoners, the "zone of autonomy'-to the extent it may meaningfully be discussed at all-seemingly exists through such doctrines as the first amendment or the eighth amendment, rather than through substantive due process rights to privacy . See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) 
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convicted, they enjoy no enhanced privacy protection through the presumption of innocence, a principle having "no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun."' 17 8 The privacy interests of detainees in jails, whether convicted or not, appear no different than those of convicted prisoners. Moreover, security needs are at least as substantial in jails as in prisons. 179 Thus, Palmer implies a denial of fourth amendment protection to jail detainees because their privacy claims are outweighed by the governmental interest in maintaining security.
Like their convicted and imprisoned counterparts, jail inmates are unlikely to prevail with due process privacy claims. The Wofish Court rejected the notion that the desire of detainees "to be free from discomfort" rises to the level of a "fundamental liberty interest"-a necessary predicate to trigger the due process right to privacy. 180 While due process privacy protection was unavailable, Woflsh did recognize a liberty interest of a different nature in unconvicted detainees to be free from "punishment" while incarcerated in jail. 18 1 Convicted inmates serving jail sentences can be punished as long as eighth amendment requirements are satisfied.' The Court stated: "In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee." 441 U.S. at 535 (footnote omitted).
Notwithstanding Wolfish, lower courts continue to recognize a substantive due process right to privacy for jail inmates. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984 ) (detainee retains a liberty interest derived from the Constitution in avoiding unwanted medication with antipsychotic drugs-inmate "grounds his asserted liberty interest in the right to privacy").
182 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n-.40 (1977) The upshot of Palmer and WoOfsh appears to be that abusive searches and seizures will be checked, if at all, by the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments (for convicted prisoners) and the due process rule against punishment without conviction (for pretrial detainees). Both doctrines (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "unjustified punishment doctrines") require a finding of "punishment" as a prerequisite to their application. 18 3 "Punishment" entails the purposeful inducement of suffering upon offenders as a response to their violation of a norm. 8 4 The Supreme Court consistently has required a showing of punitive intent by the punisher as a necessary condition for punishment, either in the due process or eighth amendment contexts. 18 5 Where the punisher's actual intent is unclear, the Court permits inferences of punitive intent if restrictions appear to be "punishment on [their] face" and nonpunitive purposes of the restrictions are unreasonable.
6
In applying the unjustified punishment doctrines, a distinction should be drawn between the role played by the concept of punishment under the respective theories. Suppose that Inmate A is detained awaiting trial and alleges that a guard is punishing him. Wolfish clearly teaches that the inmate will be granted due process relief only upon a showing that the particular conduct of the guard amounts to punishment. 18 7 On the other hand, suppose Inmate B is a convicted offender sent to prison as punishment. If he alleges that 183 A finding of "punishment" is necessary to trigger the cruel and unusual punishments clause. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) , where four Justices in the plurality and four in dissent suggested that the definition of punishment should be analyzed separate from and prior to the "cruel and unusual" issue under the eighth amendment. Id. at 94-100 (plurality); id. at 124-26 (dissent). Likewise, the due process doctrine requires that "punishment" not be imposed upon the unconvicted. See, e.g., Bell v 186 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20. For a discussion of the problem of circular reasoning embodied in the "punishment on its face" doctrine, see Gardner, supra note 184, at 810-14. 187 The inmates in Wolfish were unable to terminate the visual body cavity searches because the Court found the intrusions to be non-punitive in nature. 441 U.S. at 558-61. See also id. at 535-43 ("double bunking" not "punishment" and therefore permissible).
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the same guard conduct alleged by A amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, Inmate B may not be required to show that the particular conduct amounted to punishment, but only that it was cruel and unusual. 18 8 Because the conduct occurs within an institution whose general purpose is to punish, the punitive nature of the guard's action in the particular case may simply be assumed by the court. The matter is uncertain, however.' 8 9 If one distinguishes, as many experts advocate, between being sent to prison as punishment and being sent to prison for punishment, 190 then little basis exists for inferring that the guard's particular acts occuring within the institution are necessarily themselves "punishment."'' 1 1 188 See, e.g. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) where the Court assessed the eighth amendment quality of medical treatment provided to inmates, concluding that the government was "punishing by incarceration." The Court rejected the prisoner's argument that inadequate medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment, holding that cruelty would be manifested only if "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" were shown. Id. at 104-05. The Court did not address the issue of whether the alleged inadequate medical care itself could be, or must be shown to be, "punishment."
189 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) are the only two Supreme Court cases remotely on point. In Gamble, the Court denied the eighth amendment claim on the absence of "cruelty" without specifically finding that the prisoner had satisfied the "punishment" prong. See supra note 188. Similarly, in Chapman the Court held that "dauble ceiling" (housing two inmates in a cell designed for one) did not constitute "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" so as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 346-52. The Court assumed that "the conditions of confinement compose[d] the punishment at issue," id. at 347, apparently granting that double ceiling was punishment. The Court noted, however, that not all "deprivations" occurring within the prison constitute "punishment." Diminished job and educational opportunities resulting through double ceiling "simply are not punishments." Id. at 348. The Court offered no basis for distinguishing "conditions of confinement" which constitute punishment from "deprivations" of interests while confined which do not.
190 See, e.g., Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Rehabilitation, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 365, 388 (1971) . The distinction noted in the text is meant to clarify the theory that punishment consists solely in the loss of liberty inherent in being incarcerated and not in the infliction of additional suffering once confined within the institution. In the words of one federal court: "It is one thing for the State to send a man to the Penitentiary as a punishment for crime. It is another thing for the State. . .to do nothing meaningful for his safety, well being, and possible rehabilitation." Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970 ), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971 .
191 Case law clearly establishes that a given restraint upon a prisoner within a prison may or may not constitute "punishment" depending upon the purpose for the restraint. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190-94 (2d Cir. 1971 
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The unjustified punishment doctrines may be of only limited utility because they leave constitutionally unchecked many indignities and indecencies endured by inmates which do not amount to "punishment" or do not amount to "cruelty" under established doctrine. The following hypothetical examples of undeniable affronts to privacy 1 9 2 and dignity illustrate some such seemingly unprotected invasions of fundamental rights.
Voyeurism
Suppose male guards working in women's jails and prisons secretly photograph female inmates as they shower, use toilet facilities, and engage in other intimate activities.' 9 3 While trying not to alert the inmates to their actions, the guards distribute the photographs to other guards and to people outside the institution. Nevertheless, the inmates discover that the guards are photographing them and bring actions alleging violation of their civil rights.
Pre-Palmer caselaw recognizes violations of constitutional rights to privacy in such situations. Several cases find violations of inmate privacy rights where guards of the opposite sex are merely present in situations where they can viewinmates in the nude. 9 4 According imposed for inmate's protection and the protection of others); United States v. Hopkins, 187 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D. Md. 1960 ) (solitary confinement not punishment if imposed for inmate's "own protection"). Moreover, while systematic corporal punishment in prisons is cruel and unusual punishment, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) , "isolated assaults" on inmates by prison guards are generally unactionable under the Federal Civil Rights Act. S. KRANrz, supra note 9, at 182. 192 The concept of privacy is notoriously difficult to define. Some definiton is essential lest privacy be condemned by the notion that "[a] concept in danger of embracing everything is a concept in danger of conveying nothing." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru- TIONAL LAw 888-89 (1978) . Whatever its general definition, see supra note 1, privacy surely encompasses uninvited entry into areas of bodily intimacy. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 14; Gerety, supra note 1, at 266. This is the subject of two of the three examples to follow in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 193-214. The third example, infra text accompanying notes 215-23, the unauthorized reading of a person's diary, also clearly is a situation raising substantial privacy issues. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 433 (1976) (Marshall,J., concurring) .
193 For a non-prison case involving facts similar to the hypothetical in the text, see York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963 ), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964 . The analysis in the text would also apply if a female guard made similar observations of a male inmate.
194 See Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982 ) (male inmate's allegation that female guards engage in a "certain amount of viewing" of prisoners' intimacies may state a valid right to privacy claim); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D. Cal. 1981 
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to these courts, the taking of the photographs likely constitutes "unreasonable searches" under the fourth amendment, 9 5 while the distribution of the photos violates due process privacy.' 9 6 In the words of one court: "We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figured from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity. ' "197 Palmer, however, seriously exacerbates the plight of the photographed inmates. Assuming that the inmates in either the jail or prison context must establish that the particular action of the guards constitutes unjustified punishment, 9 8 substantial problems arise. The conduct of the voyeur guards hardly appears to be "punitive." They intend to inflict no unpleasantness upon the subjects of their cameras' eyes, indeed they do all they can to assure that the inmates never discover the intrusions into their intimacy. 1 99 In fact, the photographed subjects may never become aware of their alleged unjustified "punishment" until after release from custody. While the inmates' discovery of the guards' activities will likely result in mental anguish even if it occurs after release, the resulting suffering of the former inmates is unlike that generally connected with the concept of punishment. Punished persons characteristically are aware of their suffering at the time the actions inducing the unpleasant feel- Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095 , 1099 -1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1979 ), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980 ) (female inmate's privacy rights violated by the risk of being viewed by a male guard while in the nude or using the toilet). But see Grummett v. Rushen, 587 F. Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D. Cal. 1984 ) (male inmates' rights to privacy not violated by distant and casual viewing of them in the nude by female guards); Avery v. Perrin, 473 F. Supp. 90, 92 (D.N.H. 1979 ) (male inmate's right to privacy not violated even though a female guard might observe him in the nude while she delivers the mail).
195 Pre-Palmer courts considering the hypothetical case in the text would likely analogize to the non-prison case of York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1963 ), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 989 (1964 , where the court suggested that the taking of nude photographs by the police of a female victim of an assault might constitute an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. But see Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966) 
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ings occur. 20 0 Moreover, punishment entails the purposeful infliction of suffering. 20 1 The voyeur guards have no such purpose, nor are their actions sufficiently "punitive on their face" to cause courts to infer punitive intent. 20 2 Therefore, neither convicted prisoners nor unconvicted detainees appear able to make the necessary showing of "punishment" to trigger their respective unjustified punishment doctrines.
20 3
200 Id. In discussing the possibility of governing prison searches under the cruel and unusual punishment clause, a leading article maintains that " [o] nly searches involving physical abuse and purposeful harassment would be proscribed." Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 9, at 1051. 201 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. None of the difficulties with doctrines grounded in the concept of punishment discussed in that text are encountered under a right to privacy theory. While one seemingly cannot be "punished" without knowing it, privacy invasions do not depend upon the victim's awareness of their occurrences and thus may actually be unknown to the intrudee. See Benn, supra note 1, at 10-11; Gross, supra note 1, at 193; Parker, supra note 1, at 278. The gist of the wrong inherent in privacy violations is not in the mental distress often associated therein, but in the denial of human dignity and the assault on human personalty. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 973-74 (1964) .
Eavesdropping and wiretapping, unwanted entry into another's home, may be the occasion and cause of distress and embarrassment but that is not what makes these acts of intrusion wrongful. They are wrongful because they are demeaning of individuality, and they are such whether or not they cause emotional trauma.
Id.
202 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. The conduct of the voyeur guards manifests few of the "earmarks of punishment." See Gardner, supra note 184, at 810-14. 203 Unconvicted detainees would surely be frustrated in their attempts at establishing a due process violation because of their inability to show "punishment." See supra notes 180-81, 186-87 and accompanying text. Cf. Olgin v. Darnell, 664 F.2d 107, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1981) (not "punishment" for jail officials to remove detainee's clothing except for underwear in response to his assault on another inmate and his threat to set fire to the jail where expressed purpose of clothing removal was to calm the inmate and to avoid the risk of fire). Convicted offenders may fare better if, assuming contrary to the assumption made in the text, they can rely on their incarceration in general as sufficient "punishment" to trigger the eighth amendment inquiry. See supra text accompanying notes 187-91. Even so, they might encounter difficulty in establishing that the voyeur guards' conduct was "cruel and unusual" under established doctrine requiring "deliberate indifference" to prisoners' interests in being free from unnecessary pain and suffering. See supra note 188; see also supra note 200. The voyeur guards do not "deliberately" cause pain and suffering, indeed they attempt to avoid such by concealing their conduct from the inmates. Their conduct might thus be characterized as "reckless" or merely "negligent" and not "deliberate. " See Dejesus v. Coughlin, No. 83 Civ. 2403 , slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1984 (in order to state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, an unreasonable risk of injury must be accompanied by "circumstances indicating an evil intent, or recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to the consequences of [prison officials'] conduct for those under [their] control"). If, however, the conduct of the voyeur guards does amount to cruel and unusual punishment so far as the convicted prisoners are concerned, an anomaly is created because the very same conduct of the guards in the unconvicted detainee context would apparently go unprotected under the due process doctrine.
1985]
Offensive Body Searches
Certain morally offensive body searches also appear to be unprotected. Suppose male guards routinely conduct body cavity searches and manual patdowns of the genital areas of female inmates. 20 4 The government argues that such intrusions are necessary for security purposes 20 5 and cannot entirely be done by female guards due to possible employment discrimination problems. 20 6 Inmates object to the intrusions by male guards on two grounds: such intrusions by males are per se violative of constitutional rights and the intrusions are often conducted in bad faith either to humiliate the inmate or to sexually gratify the guard.
As with the voyeur hypothetical, caselaw prior to Palmer would utilize constitutional rights to privacy to protect the inmates from intrusive body searches by guards of the opposite sex, even in the absence of bad faith by the guards. 2 07 Such searches done to harass or to sexually gratify would afortiori be prohibited as violations of inmate privacy.
